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COURT STANDARDS ON JOINT INVENTORSHIP
Kan: Court Standards
on Joint Inventorship & Authorship
& AUTHORSHIP
By Steven S. Kan'

ABSTRACT
Sequential workflow steps in creating knowledge works and
complementary intellectual endeavors in collaboration are focused
to reveal opportunistic behaviors lurking in the step of fixing
intellectual fruit into a tangible medium and the control of
decision-making authority over a knowledge project. A review of
frequently cited cases shows that joint inventorship standards are
efficient, while joint authorship standards developed recently are
inefficient. The root cause of the disparity is traced to the
copyright law's failure to insist on the truthful identity of the
subject making intellectual contribution, for which patent law even
mandates

a

patent

invalidation

when

necessary.

1. Visiting Professor, Graduate Institute of Law and Economics, College of
Economics, Zhejiang University. I am grateful to Dean Jin-Chuan Shi for
relieving some of my teaching duty, to Professors Tze-Shiou Chien and ChunSin Hwang for helpful comments and suggestions, and to former thesis student
Lydia Liu for inspiring me into this interesting research. For previous drafts
leading to this Note, I appreciate the encouragement and feedbacks of law and
economics seminar participants at Nanjing University of Science and
Technology, Zhejiang University, and National Tsing Hua University, and
conference participants at Taiwan's First Conference on Empirical Law
Research and the Sixth Chinese Law and Economics Forum. Any merit of this
note is God's grace; all errors are mine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual collaboration has become almost indispensable in

knowledge creation as a result of structural changes in technology
and economic development. Attribution of an inventor or author
offers fame as well as some other organizational functions and, as
elucidated by Professor Catherine Fisk, has a social value separate
from ownership. 2 The value of sole attribution is usually higher

than that of joint attribution and their difference may create room
for opportunistic behaviors,3 thus, court standards in resolving
joint inventorship and authorship disputes are important to the

development of a knowledge based economy. Nevertheless, recent
growing concerns with misattribution suggest that the existing
stocks of court standards on attribution disputes are somewhat
deficient in protecting true inventors and authors.4
Two types of errors in inventor attribution are identified in

patent law.' The first type of error, nonjoinder, occurs when a true
inventor is not attributed in a patent application or a granted

patent. The second type of error, misjoinder, occurs when an
inventor is falsely attributed. Such errors may similarly occur in
2. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and
Norms of Attribution, 95 GEo. L.J. 49 (2006) (detailing attribution's role in
signaling human capital in a knowledge economy).
3. Enforcement of intellectual property helps provide an incentive for
collaborative knowledge work of scientific or artistic nature. The difference
between sole ownership and equally divided joint ownership of intellectual
property may also create room for opportunistic behaviors. Nevertheless, this
Note does not consider ownership interest.
4. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, My Patent, Your Patent, or Our Patent?
Inventorship Disputes Within Academic Research Groups, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 125 (2006), Kyle Grimshaw, A Victory for the Student Researcher: Chou
v. University of Chicago, DUKE L. & TECH REV. 35 (2001), and Lisa G. Lerman,

Misattributionin Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism,Ghostwriting, and Authorship,
42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467 (2001).
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2006) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented."); 35
U.S.C. § 256 (2006) (correction of named inventor error). "[T]he first and true
inventor or discoverer" can be traced all way back to the Patent Act of 1790, ch.
7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/4
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authorial attribution of copyrightable works-nonjoinder for a
true, but unnamed author, and misjoinder for a named, but false
author. Determination of authorship in court, however, is more
complicated than that of inventorship because some institutional
aspects of copyright law are more susceptible to opportunistic
behaviors. For instance, in contrast with patent examination,
neither application, registration, nor deposit of an authorial work is
required for copyright protection.6 Thus, while false attribution
may be detected during patent examination, aversion to censorship
makes early detection of misattribution in an authorial work
unlikely. Also, the duration of copyright protection lasts for
seventy years after the last surviving author's death, suggesting a
much longer period of opportunistic threat than that under patent
law.7 More importantly, the laws show a drastic difference in
dealing with the truthful identity of the subject making the
intellectual contribution. Whereas patent law is specific about the
two types of attribution error and their correction, copyright law
stipulates nothing of the sort.
This Note conducts a comparative evaluation of court standards
on joint inventorship and authorship, taking into account
opportunistic behaviors and institutional differences between
patent law and copyright law. Specifically, my purpose is to
distinguish efficient court standards from inefficient ones and find
the root cause of this efficiency disparity. The workflow model of
knowledge project that includes workflow steps for initiating a
project idea, gathering data, conducting experiments, confirming
the project idea, instantiating the confirmed project idea, and
fixing consistent instantiations in a tangible medium helps fulfill
this purpose for two reasons:8 First, iis sequential nature helps
capture the above-mentioned institutional differences in the
6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 407(a), 408(a) (2006) (setting deposit and registration
standards, respectfully, for copyright protection).

7. 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (2006).
8. The workflow model helps establish in a separate paper the proposition
that intellectual contribution is the efficient boundary of inventorship and
authorship.
Consistent with this proposition, American judges have
significantly contributed to the development of the United States the world's
knowledge center in the twentieth century. See Steven S. Kan, The Efficient
Boundary of Inventorship and Authorship, 19 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH., & INTELL.
PROP. L. 17 (2009).

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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creation of scientific and artistic works. Second, with different
intellectual collaborators responsible for different workflow steps,
it can accommodate complementary intellectual endeavors. The
workflow model thus offers theoretical insights into insufficiently
recognized opportunistic behaviors lurking in the step of fixing
intellectual contributions into a tangible medium and the control of
decision making authority over a collaborative knowledge project.
Against this backdrop, frequently cited court cases spanning a
period of more than ninety years are carefully reviewed to obtain
four major empirical findings. First, consistent with the economic
analysis, patent courts' determination of joint inventorship and
defeat of opportunistic behaviors have been perfectly efficient.9
Second, copyright courts' determination of joint authors and the
defeat of opportunistic behaviors were similarly efficient until very
recently. Third, inefficiency occurred only in joint authorship
standards of independently copyrightable contribution, mutual
intent, and control that developed after the passage of Copyright
Act of 1976. Fourth, the inefficient joint authorship standards
were all biased in favor of opportunists and against true authors.
Despite the technical failure of recent courts in heeding the
sequential nature of workflow steps and the fact that
complementary intellectual endeavors cannot fully account for the
efficiency disparity, the technical framework adopted is extremely
useful in exposing the issues involved and offering a comparative
investigation. After rejecting some institutional factors, the root
cause of the disparity is ultimately traced to the copyright law's
failure to insist on the truthful identity of the subject making the
intellectual contribution, for which the patent law mandates a
correction of misattribution, or even a patent invalidation when
necessary. This Note concludes that truthful identify of the subject
making the intellectual contribution has successfully guided patent
courts' development of efficient inventorship standards and should
be amended to copyright law as the Pole Star in guiding copyright
courts' adventure in joint authorship determination.
The remainder is organized into four sections.
Section I
9. Essentially, court determination in a reviewed case is deemed efficient
when litigants without intellectual contribution were denied attribution.
Conversely, it is deemed inefficient when a litigant with intellectual contribution
was denied attribution.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/4
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elucidates intellectual collaboration and its organizational forms to
prepare for the analysis of opportunistic behaviors involved in a
collaborative knowledge project.
The sequential nature of
workflow steps and the pure form of complementary intellectual
collaboration are the focus of Section II to reveal insufficiently
recognized opportunistic behaviors. Against such a backdrop, this
Section also reviews Professor David Nimmer's and Professor
Paul Goldstein's joint authorship paradigms to show that any
requirement of mutual intent is biased in favor of the dominant
decision maker and against the true author."0
Section III
summarizes courts' efficient determination of joint inventorship
and authorship and successful defeat of opportunistic behaviors.
Cases summarized in Section IV reveal the inefficiency of recent
joint authorship standards and the unrecognized fate of Nimmer's
and Goldstein's paradigms. While the purported standard of
mutual intent surprisingly turned into that of superintendence and
control, the root cause of their inefficiency is traced to the
copyright law's failure to insist on the truthful identify of the
subject making the intellectual contribution. Finally, a brief
conclusion follows.
II.

INTELLECTUAL COLLABORATION AND ITS
ORGANIZATION

No collaboration exists, for instance, in an anthology of several
separate short stories, because each writer alone completes all six
workflow steps of her story. There is no transaction cost among
the writers because they do not interact to connect their stories.
For the same reason, there is no collaboration between an inventor
of a combination patent and the original patentees, or between
writers of a parody and its original song." Collaborative creation
10. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

ch. 6 (2007); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE
passim (2d ed. supp. 2004).
11. No authorization from previous patentees or the original songwriter is

required because some new knowledge may pose the threat of Schumpeter's
creative destruction to existing knowledge. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
(1975). First Amendment
issues and fair use are also involved in parody. See Richard A. Posner, When Is
Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992); Anastasia P. Winslow,
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-85
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of new scientific or artistic knowledge involves transactions
among participants of the knowledge project to organize their
workflow steps. A workflow step may be completed by an
individual alone or may be completed by two individuals working
together; they may also work separately because some endeavors
are dividable. Some necessary element for the workflow step's
success may be acquired through collaboration with a service
provider in the market; others could only result from the synergy
of two collaborators. With a slew of dividable endeavors and
possible synergy, the workflow model indicates that there are a
great number of possible ways to organize collaboration.
There are two types of endeavors associated with a collaborative
project. The first is market substitutable and the other is
intellectual. A collaborator making market substitutable endeavors
simply applies existing knowledge and does not create new
knowledge, whereas a collaborator making intellectual endeavors
engages in market non-substitutable virtual transactions to create
new knowledge. The two kinds of endeavors, however, usually
coexist in a collaborative project. For instance, an individual
engaging in a virtual transaction with her targeted patrons in mind,
for example, patent examiners, journal referees, and promoters of
artistic works, can be more focused by hiring an assistant to help
out with some chores and the two become collaborators. She may
additionally engage another individual with some virtual
transaction to save more time for her family. Overall in the
collaboration, there are two intellectual collaborators and a market
substitutable collaborator.
The use of market substitutable
collaboration involves insignificant transaction cost, and the use of
intellectual collaboration may help lower the high transaction cost
associated with a virtual transaction. Neither type of collaboration
should be discouraged because they help reduce transaction cost;
nevertheless, collaborators who made nothing but market
substitutable endeavors should not be granted joint attribution
because they only applied existing knowledge.
The remainder focuses on intellectual collaboration. Without
loss of generality, only two intellectual collaborators, A and B, are
Rapping on a Revolving Door: An Economics Analysis of Parody and Campbell

v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 767 (1996) (finding courts'
applications of the fair use standard in parody cases being inconsistent).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/4
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considered in introducing three pure organizational forms of
intellectual collaboration.
The first is equal intellectual
collaboration, where A and B share equal intellectual endeavors in
all steps involved. It suggests that A and B have similar abilities
and coordinate with each other in the workflow steps to save their
time and energy for other activities. The second is synergistic
intellectual collaboration, where A's intellectual endeavors are
disproportional to that of B's throughout all steps. If intellectual
endeavor is measured in time, it suggests that B's time spent,
however little, is crucial. The reason is that, were it not for the
crucial synergy from B in clearing out a blind spot, no matter how
much more time A would spend, she could not complete the step.
The third is complementary intellectual collaboration, where A and
B do not make their intellectual endeavors in the same workflow
step. It means that A and B are respectively specialized in different
steps and they collaborate for complementary specializations. As
suggested, a knowledge creator may need time for other projects,
have a blind spot in completing the step, and even lack a required
expertise. Actual organization of intellectual collaboration is
usually a mixture of pure forms.
Individuals A and B, nevertheless, must overcome various
transaction costs to become intellectual collaborators. Like that in
a Coaseian transaction, they need to coordinate with each other for
the time, the expertise, and the inhibiting constraints so that each
one is assured that the other is reliable in delivering the promised
intellectual endeavors. Whether A approaches B or B approaches
A, they initially may have separate goals, different tastes, and
conflicting intellectual constraints. Thus, they need to additionally
iron out their differences in cognizing a problem and targeting
intended patrons before reaching a shared vision of their
intellectual collaboration. After obtaining the shared vision, they
also need to settle their differences in approaching and solving the
problem and instantiating various aspects of a solution to the
problem.
Iterations are usually involved during the process.
The
additional coordination of virtual transactions with the targeted
patrons is at the center of the process; however, there can be no
meaningful interaction between the two intellectual collaborators
and their targeted patrons. Realistic interactions will not start until
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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they have invested a significant amount of their time and energy
and produced at least some of their intellectual fruits. The
transaction cost and risk involved in reaching and maintaining a
particular organizational form of intellectual collaboration are
apparently much higher than those associated with a Coaseian real
exchange. Constitutional promotion of intellectual collaboration
for new knowledge creation therefore finds its justification in the
transaction cost and risk reduction. As long as A and B make
intellectual contributions from their intellectual collaboration, they
should be jointly attributed; therefore, intellectual contribution is
also the efficient boundary of joint inventorship and authorship.
The invention or authorial work whose joint attribution is at
dispute in court must have been the result of a consistent project
that was allegedly collaborative in nature.12 Insofar as intellectual
collaboration worked out between A and B, its total transaction
cost, including both that in reaching a particular organizational
form and that in persuading their targeted patrons, should have
been lower than that of their originally separate knowledge
projects; otherwise, they would have worked alone. In this sense,
their intellectual collaboration resulted in a net social gain. Since
the chosen organizational form and the social gain took place
before the misattribution suit is brought, the court cannot possibly
reduce or redistribute the transaction costs that have already
incurred. Court decisions, nevertheless, may influence potential
intellectual collaborators' choice of a particular organizational
form. Since their tastes, visions, abilities, and circumstances are
so diverse, there is no a priori grotind to consider any particular
organizational form to be inefficient for intellectual collaborators.
The least-cost organizational form can only be worked out by the
intellectual collaborators involved. Consequently, it is inefficient
for the courts to impede any organizational form of intellectual
collaboration-the first result of my transaction cost analysis.

12. What fixed in a tangible medium, the result of the sixth step, defines the
knowledge work at dispute in court. The confirmed project idea and its
instantiations, the results of the fourth and fifth steps, must be consistent with
what fixed in a tangible medium to form a consistent knowledge project. The
separation of attribution and ownership is also assumed. See Kan, supra note 8,
at 17.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/4
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III. OPPORTUNISM AND JOINT ATTRIBUTION
DETERMINATION
Joint attribution determination in court is more than establishing
intellectual contribution as the boundary of inventorship and
authorship because misjoinder and nonjoinder cases suggest that
Professor Oliver E. Williamson's emphasis of opportunism should
not be neglected. 3 Opportunistic behaviors lurk in any form of
intellectual collaboration, however, it is most acute in the pure
form of complementary intellectual collaboration.
Below,
Subsection A focuses on sequential workflow steps and
complementary intellectual endeavors to illuminate opportunistic
behaviors lurking in the step of fixing intellectual fruits in a
tangible medium and the control of decision making authority. As
Nimmer's and Goldstein's positions and premises of joint
authorship paradigms are closely related, Subsection B elucidates
common neglect with the cause and consequence of opportunistic
behaviors. 4
The analysis shows that both independently
copyrightable contribution and mutual intent are biased in favor of
the dominant decision maker and against a true joint author.
Lastly, in Subsection C, complementary intellectual contributions
from complementary specializations help lead to the "but for" test
of joint attribution determination.
A.

OpportunisticBehaviors Lurking in Complementary
Specializations

Complementary intellectual collaboration is advantageous in
fully exploiting the benefits of complementary specializations.
However, its organization involves high transaction costs. Each
13. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF

CAPITALISM (1998). The greed for exclusive intellectual property, though not
the motivation here, tends to exacerbate attribution-related opportunistic
behaviors.
14. Some possible opportunistic behaviors are recognized in authorship
guidelines of major research universities and journals. See, e.g., Harvard
University,
Authorship
Guidelines,
http://www.hms.harvard.edu/integrity/authorship.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2009). Despite its obvious preventive implication on authorship guideline, this
Note focuses on court standards governing attribution disputes.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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intellectual collaborator has an expertise the other does not have;
but for her market non-substitutable endeavors, one knows that the
other cannot complete the consistent project alone. The exchange
of market non-substitutable endeavors between two potential
intellectual collaborators thus represents the familiar case of
bilateral monopoly. The sequential nature of the workflow steps
further indicates that complementary specializations are performed
sequentially. As that between two vertically situated firms, the
threat of holdup underlies the difficulty in organizing
complementary intellectual endeavors. 5
However A and B enter into complementary intellectual
collaboration, an ex ante agreement without an effective
enforcement mechanism may be opportunistically relegated ex
post. For example, suppose that A is very imaginative in designing
and conducting new experiments, which are crucial for an
instantiation of a confirmed project, but very poor in integrating
different instantiations in writing, which is B's talent. Apparently,
the step of conducting experiments precedes that of instantiating
the confirmed project idea. The requirement for legal protection
thus indicates that B controls the last step of fixing consistent
instantiations in a tangible medium. While B may disguise that he
has not been able to put things together, A is trustfully waiting for
B's completion of the last step.
At the same time, B
opportunistically files a patent application or copyright registration
under his name only.
Whereas asset specificity is prominently featured in holdup
literature, institutional sources are more important in considering
B's ex post opportunistic behavior here. 6 The likely detection of
opportunistic first-filing of a patent application in patent
interference proceedings suggests that patent law's special
15. See generally
ANALYSIS

OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Oliver E. Williamson,

Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.
L. & ECON. 233 (1979).

16. Compare Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, & Armen A. Alchian,
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978) (analyzing the specificity of physical
assets), with Robert F. Freeland, CreatingHoldup Through Vertical Integration:
FisherBody Re-visited, 43 J.L. & ECON. 33 (2000) (emphasizing the specificity

of intellectual assets).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/4
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attention to the true inventor serves as a mechanism in enforcing
the ex ante agreement in complementary intellectual endeavors.
Nevertheless, should B's opportunistic behavior occur, A would
have to bear the burden of proof in court to show that she was
indeed the nonjoinder. 17 As logs might not be properly kept or, in
confirming a project idea, the intellectual contribution fails to be
recorded, the burden of proof works to weaken the deterrence
effect of patent interference in discouraging the opportunistic firstfiling of a patent application. The copyright law's aversion to
censorship similarly suggests that opportunistic behaviors in the
first filing of copyright registration under one's own name should
The same reasoning suggests that such
be more serious.
opportunistic behaviors would more likely occur in artistic works
than academic papers because the latter are subject to peer review.
As intellectual collaboration has become institutionalized
through knowledge teams at big businesses, universities, and
government agencies, opportunistic behaviors may also occur
when a third person controls the decision-making authority of a
collaborative knowledge project. 8 Dominant control of decisionmaking authority in this sense may even lead to both misjoinder
and nonjoinder and make attribution determination more
complicated. 9 For instance, suppose the supervisor of A and B is a
senior researcher and controls budgets, labs, and promotions.
Once in a while, the supervisor obtains some additional
understanding of A and B's project through requests for resources
or a progress report. At a crucial juncture, the supervisor may hint
that he would like to be attributed as the third knowledge creator
for his help and suggestions." Conversely, A or B may be willing
17. While the standard of proof in civil cases is a mere preponderance of
evidence, the hypothetical example in the text implies a fraud and the proof
would be elevated to the clear and convincing standard. See, e.g., Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1978).
18. It does not violate the funding irrelevance assumption because
intellectual collaborators are usually asked to sign an agreement that assigns
resulting intellectual property ownership to the funding agency.
19. The author would like to emphasize that the dominance of intellectual
content or intellectual process is not criticized here.
20. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on
Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1162, 1207
(2000) (arguing that mutual intent allows the dominant party to "lure others into
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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to attribute the supervisor for a promotion promise or a lab
upgrade. 2' Regardless of whose initiation and the motivation
behind, the supervisor would likely turn out to be the third
knowledge creator, especially when no pecuniary benefit of
intellectual property is involved. When the ownership interest of
intellectual property cannot be ignored, true collaborators A and B
would have a strong incentive to resist its dilution such that
misjoinder would not occur. Thus, there are data supporting that
the supervisor would more likely become a misjoinder in a
scholarly journal than in a patent application.22
The supervisor may even have an upper hand in faking that he
has confirmed the project idea. The reason is that he may be able
to collude with B in corroborating his false intellectual
contribution in confirming the project idea, which would be hard
to refute in court because of its purely intellectual nature. As long
as the number of total attributions is unchanged, B might be
indifferent to with whom his name is jointly attributed, unless he
pays sufficiently strong deference to honesty and loyalty. The
balance would thus be tilted to B's collusion with the supervisor
when he could help the paper be published in a more prestigious
journal, for example. Similarly, when pecuniary benefits of
intellectual property cannot be ignored, B's share in it would be
unchanged if the total number of attributions is unchanged. Thus,
given that B does not object to colluding with his supervisor, he
might as well collude in denying A's intellectual contribution and
turning A into the nonjoinder.
Misjoinder in the collusive inclusion of a supervisor is more like
contributing material to a unitary work, all the while withholding the intent to
share its economic and reputational benefits").
21. See generally Sean B. Seymore, How Does My Work Become Our Work?
Dilution of Authorship in Scientific Papers, and the Need for the Academy to
Obey Copyright Law, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2006) (criticizing authorship
inflation as a result of academic gifts).
22. Cross comparisons of the common names listed in scholarly journal
papers and patents show that the average number of names of the former is
greater than that in the latter. Data suggest that there are misjoinders in journal
articles. See, e.g., Martin Meyer & Sujit Bhattacharya, Commonalities and
Differences between Scholarly and Technical Collaboration:An Exploration of
Co-invention and Co-authorship Analyses, 61 SCIENTOMETRICS 443 (2004);

Philippe Ducor, Coauthorshipand Coinventorship,289 SCIENCE 873 (2000).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/4
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a victimless crime. Nonjoinder, on the other hand, does involve a
victim. In both cases, opportunism and collusion distort the
organizational roles of attribution and increase overall transaction
costs in society. Sequential workflow steps and complementary
intellectual endeavors help reveal opportunistic behaviors lurking
in the control of decision-making authority and the step of fixing
intellectual fruits into a tangible medium. It indicates additionally
that, without paying sufficient attention to institutional
backgrounds, courts may not be effective in checking ex post
relegation of intellectual collaboration.
B.

Joint Authorship Paradigms

Patent law stipulates three allowable conditions for joint
application, while copyright law stipulates what constitutes a joint
work. Joint patent applications are allowed even when inventors
did not (1) physically work together or at the same time, (2) make
the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) contribute to the
subject matter of every claim of the patent.2 3 The allowable
conditions are apparently workflow-centered and provide room for
inventors to utilize complementary specializations. In contrast,
copyright law stipulates four requirements for a legally defined
joint work.24 The first requires that there are two or more authors.2 5
The second requires the authors to have the intention to merge
their contributions. The third specifies the work as a unitary whole
composed of inseparable or interdependent parts. The fourth
requires the inseparable or interdependent parts to be those into
which authorial contributions are merged. In comparison, a joint
invention apparently meets in principle the factors laid out in the
23. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2006).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). The definition distinguishes a joint work from a

collective or a derivative work. It is essential because joint authors own equal
and undivided interests in the whole work, whereas authors of collective and
derivative works own only the part of their respective contributions. See §
101(c).
25. Paulette S. Fox, Note, Preserving the Collaborative Spirit of American
Theatre: The Need for a "JointAuthorship Default Rule" in Light of the Rent
Decision's Unanswered Question, 19 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 497 (2001)

(reviewing Congress's intent in narrowing the "joint work" definition in the
1976 Copyright Act).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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first and the third requirements. Since complementary intellectual
contributions can be imbedded in inseparable or interdependent
parts, the fourth requirement does not exclude complementary
intellectual endeavors. The distinction between joint invention and
joint work is, thus, only in the second requirement of intention.
Nimmer's and Goldstein's joint authorship paradigms are
closely related to complementary intellectual endeavors and
copyright law's second requirement of authorial intention. In
addition, the Second and Ninth Circuits have purportedly
advocated the two-pronged test of independently copyrightable
contribution and mutual intent for joint authorship.26 The
following analyzes the two joint authorship paradigms in light of
opportunistic behaviors lurking in complementary specializations.
1.

Independently Copyrightable Contribution

Nimmer's paradigm of joint authorship, in summary, is obtained
through the consideration of complementary intellectual endeavors
between two individuals, "with A contributing sparkling plot ideas
and B weaving them into a completed screenplay."27 Thus,
Nimmer recognizes that confirming the project idea and fixing
consistent instantiations in a tangible medium may be separate
workflow steps undertaken by two persons of complementary
specializations. Consistent with the first result of my transaction
cost analysis, he considers the independently copyrightable
contribution requirement for joint authorship to be inefficient and
takes the position that "copyright protection should extend both to
the contributor of the skeletal ideas and the contributor who
fleshes out the project."28
In contrast, the Goldstein paradigm is obtained in considering
26. A search of LexisNexis database shows that the phrase "independently
copyrightable contributions" first appeared in the case of Rohauer v. Killiam
Shows, Inc., where a derivative work was involved. 551 F.2d 484, 493 (2d Cir.
1977). Adoption of independently copyrightable contributions as a joint
authorship standard did not pick up until the late 1980s. A similar search shows
that the phrase "mutual intent" first appeared in Lin-Brook Builders Hardware
v. Gertler. 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965). Nevertheless, it only became
popularly adopted after the late 1980s.
27. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 6.07[A][3][a].
28. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/4
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whether there should be a "co-ownership interest" associated with
a "collaborative contribution. '29 In this context, Goldstein adopts
the position that a person cannot be a joint author unless he has
made an independently copyrightable contribution. His position is
quite understandable because he is, as Justice Antonin Scalia is in
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., concerned
with "no discernable limits" to co-ownership interest in
copyright.3 ° Unlike Nimmer's explicit reference to plot ideas,
which must be intellectual contributions in nature, Goldstein's
"collaborative
contribution" seems to include intellectual
endeavors as well as market substitutable endeavors. Failing to
distinguish intellectual collaboration from market substitutable
collaboration, he is left with no choice but to take a stricter
interpretation to pin down the limit of co-ownership interest. By
requiring that each joint author must contribute "original
expression that could stand on its own," the Goldstein paradigm
nevertheless precludes complementary specializations and is
inefficient.
2.

Mutual Intent

Nimmer and Goldstein, nevertheless, share a common view on
copyright law's intention requirement. Before stating his stricter
interpretation of joint authorship, Goldstein explicitly writes, "[flor
a joint work to exist, each author must have intended to create a
joint work at the time he made his contribution."'" On the other
hand, Nimmer's view is reflected in his position that "given the
requisite preconcerted intent, there should be no further
requirement that A and B each independently contribute
copyrightable
expression."32
The "preconcerted
intent"
qualification is clear since there is also the premise that A and B
are collaborators working "in furtherance of a common design."
Thus, contrary to the general impression, Nimmer considers
mutual intent highly and may even agree with Goldstein's stand29. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 4.2.1.2.
30. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35
(2003); see also Kan, supra note 8, section I.C.
31. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 4.2.1.2 (emphasis added).
32. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 6.07[A][3][a] (emphasis added).
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alone authorship in the absence of preconcerted intent.33
There are, however, two subtle differences between Nimmer's
and Goldstein's interpretations of the intention requirement. First,
while Nimmer's is arguably more about joint authorship,
Goldstein's is clearly about joint work. It is not only perceivable
but also true that two collaborators intending to create a joint work
may not share mutual intent to be joint authors.34 Therefore, it is
uncertain how intention for joint work can be translated into
mutual intent for joint authorship. Second, with regard to the time
when intention is manifested, while Nimmer suggests a time
before any intellectual contribution is made, Goldstein's was at a
much later time when "he made his contribution."35 Despite the
subtlety involved, the differences would not matter if opportunistic
behaviors do not occur. As two sides of the same coin, there can
be no joint authors without a joint work and no joint work without
joint authors.36 Intention to create a joint work is not equivalent to
intention for joint authorship only when opportunism sets a wedge
and splits the coin apart. Similarly, the preconcerted intent and the
intention manifested when contribution was made are not
equivalent only if some opportunistic behavior occurred during the
intervening period.
3.

Objective Indicia

A written agreement by A and B satisfying the test of mutual
intent cannot preclude the possibility that it was out of collusion.

33. See David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and
Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REv. 1, 159 (2001) (arguing that "copyright law is
remarkably unconcerned with any theory at all about what constitutes
authorship-with one single exception: intentionality").
34. The point is well recognized in 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, §
6.07 [B].
35. Several courts sided with Goldstein by citing the legislative history of the
1976 Copyright Act, which stated, that "[t]he touchstone here is the intention, at
the time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into an
integrated unit." See, e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th
Cir. 1994) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5735).
36. For the purposes of this Note, the exceptional case of ghost writers need
not concern us.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/4
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For example, a dominant supervisor might have colluded with B in
a written agreement showing their mutual intent to be joint authors
such that A became the nonjoinder, when A in fact made some
intellectual contribution. It may further happen that, while B and A
reached a written agreement showing mutual intent to be joint
authors, B and the dominant supervisor also reached just that.
When A turned out to be the nonjoinder and claimed joint
authorship in court, how would the court reconcile the two
Should
different written agreements into a unitary whole?
transitivity be adopted such that the supervisor, A, and B are all
joint authors? The problem would be even more complicated
when intellectual contributions were made and written agreements
were entered into at different times, in light of the subtle difference
between Nimmer's and Goldstein's interpretations of the required
intent.
As litigation involves significant costs, intellectual collaborators
who sincerely intended to be joint knowledge creators would
rarely end up seeing each other in court.37 When there was no
written agreement, courts' practice of fact-finding in search of
other evidence showing mutual intent to be joint authors is also
intriguing. Purportedly, the practice may serve some purpose
when opportunism is involved. The best argument is that objective
indicia from "billing and credit, decision making, and the right to
enter into contracts" exist.38 However, these objective indicia
cannot withstand the test of opportunism. The fact-finding
practice presumes those who claim or defend joint authorship
understand the legal consequences of their prior acts, despite
vague legal terms. Additionally, they would act accordingly
because they knew they would be held responsible for their acts.39
An ordinary person endeavoring to make intellectual contributions
for a knowledge work is apparently too simplistic and occupied to
37. Consideration of carelessness, inconsistency, or sheer stupidity is

unnecessary since what is at issue here is not fact-finding for all evidence but
fact-finding in support of mutual intent.
38. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Childress v.
Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508-09 (2d Cir. 1991)) (emphasis added). Courts have
thoroughly discussed justifying the use of such objective indicia. See discussion
infra Section IV.B.
39. The district court in Thomson explicitly denied such presumption. See
Thomson, 147 F.3d at 202 n.18.
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fit the presumption. Nevertheless, it perfectly fits an opportunist
in a different way. The reason is that an opportunist enjoys
misappropriating other's intellectual fruit and would do whatever
necessary to keep him from being caught.
The behavioral
asymmetry indicates that there could only be two possible results
of such fact-finding practice. First, the victim of opportunistic
behaviors, a nonjoinder, could not possibly present sufficient
evidence showing mutual intent. Second, the opportunist would
act consistently, such that no evidence showing his intention to
include the nonjoinder could be found.
The following two recent cases illustrate how a supervisor's
opportunistic behavior may be neglected in court. In the case of
Chou v. University of Chicago, the plaintiff's advisor and
department chairman denied her attribution and became the sole
inventor of her research result." One of the case's facts states that
"[t]he work at the laboratory was, by policy, not to be disclosed
outside the laboratory until [the chairman] approved public
disclosure."'" The quote reveals an example of the many ways that
a supervisor in control of decision making over the fixing step of a
knowledge project may use his power in defining the knowledge
work, the time of its completion, its significance, its fate, and its
attribution in his own favor. Despite the fact that the plaintiff had
faithfully spent intellectual endeavors to complete her research, the
opportunistic supervisor betrayed her and misappropriated her
intellectual contributions. Goldstein's intention at the time "when
contribution was made" thus could not help resolve the nonjoinder
problem even if the plaintiff had standing to sue.42
Moving the clock back to Nimmer's time before any
contribution was made does not help either. In another case,
Johnson v. Schmitz, the plaintiff alleged that two professors on his
40. See Chou v. Univ. of Chi., No. 99 C 4495, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2002,
at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2000), rev'd 254 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
41. Id. at *4.
42. The district court held that, without ownership interest, the plaintiff

lacked a standing to sue for correction. Id. at *6. Finding that the lower court
ruled erroneously, the appellate court reversed the district court's holding and
held that the plaintiff could seek correction sans an ownership interest. Chou v.
Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[The plaintiff] should

have the right to assert her interest, both for her own benefit and in the public
interest of assuring correct inventorship designations on patents.")
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dissertation committee misappropriated his ideas and published
them in a journal without attributing him.43 Initially, Johnson
discovered two other student workers reading his private journal.
Later, he overheard them explaining its contents to a professor.
Then, the professor asked him to explain his ideas by telling him
that "in order to complete his dissertation and pass his qualifying
exam, he would have to trust the faculty."" The two professors,
however, proved to be untrustworthy because they, before
misappropriating his ideas, discouraged Johnson from pursuing his
ideas further during his qualifying exam. The case thus confirms
why a student could not, at any time, obtain from opportunistic
professors a written agreement showing preconcerted intent to be
joint authors.
Mutual intent for joint inventorship or authorship is susceptible
to opportunistic behaviors lurking in the control of decisionmaking authority and to the step of fixing intellectual fruits in a
tangible medium. The recent turn into requiring mutual intent thus
amounts to imposing a strict burden on the more vulnerable,
innocent intellectual collaborator.45
If the mutual intent
requirement was intended to check opportunistic behaviors, then it
was wrongly directed and futile. Should it work in reducing suits
brought to court, it would deter true knowledge creation and
encourage opportunistic behaviors from dominant decision
makers. In sum, mutual intent for joint authorship, in whatever
sense, is biased in favor of the dominant decision maker and
against the true joint knowledge creator-the second result of my
transaction cost analysis.
C. The "But For" Test for Joint Attribution Determination
Taking into account the intellectual contribution as the efficient
boundary of joint inventorship and authorship and heeding
opportunistic behaviors lurking in complementary specializations,
43. Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 F. Supp. 2d 90, 91-92 (D. Conn. 2000).
44. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).

45. In England, there is no such a requirement of mutual intent to be joint
authors. Lior Zemer, Is Intention to Co-Author an "Uncertain Realm of
Policy"?, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 611, 611 (2007) (arguing that the mutual
intent requirement only creates a system that is uncertain).
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the following "but for" test is proposed for joint attribution
determination. The test examines actual endeavors during the
process-centered workflow steps and looks for the truthful
identities making complementary intellectual contributions. It is
based on the fact that intellectual contributions from
complementary specializations are complementary to each otherbut for A's intellectual contribution, B cannot complete the
consistent project, and vice versa.46 There are two steps in the test:
in the first step, the court determines if complementary intellectual
endeavors were involved for the consistent project at issue. If the
result of the examination is affirmative, then the court continues to
the next step to determine whether both A and B have made
intellectual contributions. If the result of the examination is again
affirmative, then both A and B should be jointly attributed. It is
efficient in the sense that it neither wastes time and energy in
finding unreliable and biased evidence that would only support the
lack of mutual intent, nor impedes the pure organizational form of
complementary intellectual collaboration.
IV. EFFICIENT COURT STANDARDS
When some factors set in to obscure a consistent project, the
court may fail to recognize complementary intellectual endeavors
and the complementary intellectual contributions involved. This
Section reviews a number of frequently cited cases and
summarizes courts' careful attention to the consistent project,
intellectual collaboration, and complementary intellectual
contributions. Subsection A shows particularly how patent courts
have arrived at the efficient "but for" test in cases of joint
inventorship.
Similar joint authorship determination is
summarized in Subsection B with particular attention paid to Judge

46. "But for" causation is a familiar topic in the economics of tort law. It is
borrowed here because complementary specializations are clear cut; they either
exist or fail to exist. Thus, the proposed "but for" test is free from the concern
that clear causation cannot be established. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, A New
Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799 (1983); William
Landes & Richard Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the
Scope ofLiability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/4
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Learned Hand's insights. The cases also show that mutual intent
to be joint inventors or authors was considered but not required.
Subsection C then presents several cases showing that courts have
successfully defeated a variety of opportunistic behaviors in
misattributing a true joint inventor or author. Despite institutional
differences between patent and copyright laws, they serve as a
background to Section IV's trace of the root cause of recent
inefficient joint authorship standards.
A.

The "But For'"Test in Joint Inventorship Determination

In the early twentieth century case of William R. Thropp & Sons
Co. v. De Laski & Thropp Circular Woven Tire Co., the court's
identification of the consistent project was not altered by the
appellant's challenge that the employee could not be a joint
inventor.47 After examining the workflow steps and endeavors of
the listed inventors, the court affirmed that "De Laski's ideas and
contributions were so essential and were so related to the
conception of Thropp that, without them, Thropp alone would not
have produced the invention for which the patent was issued."48 It
means, in other words, that but for Thropp's confirmed project
idea, De Laski could not have made the design, and but for De
Laski's instantiating skills, Thropp could not have finished the
inventive project.49
In light of complementary intellectual
contributions, the court correctly reached an efficient decision for
the joint inventorship issue.
Different roles of joint inventors were explicitly identified in
Monsanto Co. v. Kamp." Fact findings showed that Jahn did most
47. William R. Thropp & Sons Co. v. De Laski & Thropp Circular Woven
Tire Co., 226 F. 941 (3d Cir. 1915).
48. Id. at 949 (emphasis added).
49. It should be noted here that the "but for" consideration reflected the

appellate court's important turn from the district court's opinion, whose
allowable conditions for joint inventorship were later transformed into that for
joint application in the patent law. See De Laski & Thropp Circular Woven Tire
Co. v. William. R. Thropp & Sons Co., 218 F. 458, 464 (D.N.J. 1914) ("It is not
necessary that exactly the same idea should have occurred to each at the same
time, and that they should work out together the embodiment of that idea in a
perfected machine.").
50. Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818 (D.D.C. 1967).
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of the detailed experimental work, while the defendant Kamp
conducted some of it. They were in frequent consultation with
each other, with Jahn reporting laboratory operations and Kamp
making suggestions for further work. Kamp's expertise was, thus,
more in confirming the project idea, while Jahn's was more in
conducting experiments. The court opined, "[t]he fact that each of
the inventors plays a different role and that the contribution of one
may not be as great as that of another, does not detract from the
fact that the invention is joint, if each makes some original
contribution, though partial, to the final solution of the problem."51
The decision was clearly efficient because the judge had identified
the complementary intellectual endeavors and the confirmed
complementary intellectual contributions to the consistent project.
The court of Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Industries, Inc.
invalidated the plaintiffs patent on obviousness grounds. 2 In
addition to adopting tests of market substitutability and confirmed
project idea, the court reaffirmed, after almost sixty years, the "but
for" test of Thropp. Regarding joint inventorship, the court
opined, "one need not be able to point to a specific component as
one's sole idea, but one must be able to say that without his
contribution to the final conception, it would have been less-less
efficient, less simple, less economical, less something of benefit."53
Despite the fact that the "but for" test is not embodied in patent
law, it has become an essential tool for patent courts in
determining joint attribution of inventors. 4 Notably, the cases also
show that mutual intent and control of decision-making authority
were in the courts' consideration but never became standards of
joint inventorship.

51. Id. at 824 ("A joint invention is the product of collaboration... working
toward the same end and producing an invention by their aggregateefforts....

One may do more of the experimental work while the other makes suggestions
from time to time." (emphases added)).
52. Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
53. Id. at 1372 (emphasis added).
54. E.g., Bontrager v. Steury Corp., 457 F. Supp. 526 (N.D. Ind. 1978)

(invalidating a patent through the "but for" test).
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Efficient JointAuthorship Determination

Attention to the consistent project and the "but for" test also
stood out prominently in old cases of joint authorship
determination. The case of Maurel v. Smith was an illuminating
example. 5 Facts showed that Maurel had a written scenario and
Smith used it to complete the libretto at dispute. A comparison
between the completed libretto and the scenario enabled Judge
Hand to ascertain the consistent project in the instant case.
It is enough to say that by changes, omissions,
additions, and alterations a subsequent author
cannot avoid the debt which he owes to the maker
of the plot, or treat him merely as the suggester of
the piece. A scenario followed as much as this goes
into the bone andflesh of the production.6
The scenario and the final libretto were, thus, of a "common
design" and there were complementary intellectual contributions in
the "whole production."" In other words, the confirmed project
idea was the plaintiffs, and the defendant contributed primarily in
modifying the scenario's instantiations. Not distracted by the
defendant's argument that the plaintiff only made a mere
suggestion, Judge Learned Hand gave joint authorship to the
plaintiff, the plot maker who confirmed the project idea in his
written scenario. He did not require Maurel to have made an
independently copyrightable contribution because he looked at the
problem from the consistent project perspective and understood
that but for Maurel's intellectual contribution, there could not be
the resulting libretto.
In the case of Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel
Music Co., Marks intended his lyrics to be set to music and sold
them to a publisher, who then engaged Loraine to compose the

55. Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
56. Id. at 199 (citation omitted) (emphases added). Maurel initially intended
to collaborate with another person to build on the scenario. Smith understood

he was to use the scenario in substitution for that person. Id.
57. Id.
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music. 8 The lyricist and the composer, however, never met each
other until years later. Almost 30 years after Maurel, Judge Hand,
sitting on the appellate court, was confronted with a more difficult
problem because there was no common design when the lyrics
were written. 9 After noting that words and music of a song were
to be enjoyed and performed together because they interpenetrated
each other and their values could not be separately appraised,
Judge Hand introduced two "but for" tests. In the first, he
indicated that allowing the lyricist to exclude the melody
composer, and vice versa, would amount to a situation where one
would "take away the kernel, and leave him only the husk."6
Namely, but for their complementary intellectual contributions,
there would be no song. Likening the inseparable interests to the
threads woven into a seamless fabric, he further reasoned that but
for an otherwise advance stipulation, the interest of an undivided
whole was not separable. The second "but for" test is especially
interesting because what was important to Judge Hand in this case
was not mutual intent to be joint authors, but mutual intent to get
out of the implied relationship. Thus, he concluded, "it makes no
difference whether the authors work in concert, or even whether
they know each other; it is enough that they mean their
contributions to be complementary in the sense that they are to be
embodied in a single work to be performed as such.' ' "l The explicit
recognition of complementary contributions was the key of the
case. By focusing on the consistent project involved, Judge Hand
arrived at his "but for" tests for complementary intellectual
contributions and was not distracted by the lack of mutual intent in
58. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266
(S.D.N.Y. 1944).
59. Inasmuch as "Marks intended his lyrics be set to music", the case passed,
though indirectly, Goldstein's intent requirement for a joint work, emphatically
not joint authorship. The case might have even motivated Goldstein's carefully
crafted intent requirement.
60. Marks Music, 140 F.2d at 267.
61. Id. (emphasis added). In comparison with the three allowable conditions
for joint inventorship, two strangers could even be joint authors according to
Judge Hand. Despite that there was neither a common design nor mutual intent
for joint authorship, it was a justifiable decision because there was intention for
a joint work and a copyrighted work indeed resulted from a third party's indirect
coordination.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/4
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Consistent project and complementary intellectual contributions
were both neglected in the district court but reaffirmed by the
appellate court in the similar case of Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v.
Jerry Vogel Music Co., where the assignee of Bowman's piano
solo invited Sumner to write lyrics for the music.62 The copyright
infringement case involved copyright renewal and was brought to
the court thirty years after the song was written, during which
period neither Bowman nor Sumner complained. The district
court held that they could not be joint authors because its factfinding showed no evidence of joint authorship intention.63
Noticing the consistent project involved and adopting Judge
Hand's "but for" tests, the appellate court reversed the decision
and stated that, "[t]he result reached in the district court would
leave one of the authors of the 'new work' with but a barren right
in the words of a worthless poem, never intended to be used
alone."64 The court checked the music company's opportunistic
behavior in acquiring sole copyright ownership thirty years later
and reaffirmed that mutual intent was not required when there
were complementary intellectual contributions. It is worth noting
that complementary intellectual contributions of the three joint
authorship cases were not the result of the writers' ex ante, explicit
organization of complementary intellectual endeavors. They were
instead the result of indirect coordination by a third party. More
accurately, with some lapse in time, the intellectual endeavors
were complementary only in the ex post sense after the work was
completed. Opportunistic behaviors from record companies would
creep into these kinds of settings because a written agreement
showing preconcerted intent was simply impossible. These joint
authorship cases were remarkable and efficient because the courts
were able to discern the organizational settings and insist on

62. Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.
1955), superseded by statute, 1976 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541, as recognized in Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children and Adults of
La., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
63. Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 115 F. Supp.
759 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
64. Shapiro Bernstein, 221 F.2d at 570 (emphasis added). The quote

suggests again the origin of Goldstein's authorial intention.
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complementary intellectual contributions.
Attention to consistent project and complementary intellectual
contributions by courts in joint authorship cases degenerated after
the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 until the recent case of
Gaiman v. McFarlane.65 The famous case has been interpreted as
one that embraced Nimmer's paradigm of joint authorship, and
one that broke away from Goldstein's joint authorship standard of
independently copyrightable contribution.6 6
Judge Richard
Posner's court opinion showed some consistency with my
In addressing whether the comic book
economic analysis.
characters were copyrightable, he paid attention to not only the
interpenetrating nature of literary description combined with a
drawing, but also the instantiations of a specific name, appearance,
and speech to be a copyrightable character. He was also close to
finding complementary intellectual endeavors in the creation of a
comic book--"the writer, the penciler who creates the art work [ ],
the inker ... who makes a black and white plate of the art work,
and the colorist who colors it."'67 Regarding whether Gaiman and
McFarlane should be joint authors, Judge Posner accepted
Nimmer's preconcerted intent and agreed that the two parties have
"set out to create a character jointly. ' 68 Then, he offered an
impressive remark, "it would be paradoxical if though the result of
their joint labors had more than enough originality and creativity
to be copyrightable, no one could claim copyright. That would be
6 9 It vividly resembles the
peeling the onion until it disappeared."
remark-"take away the kernel, and leave him only the husk"offered by Judge Hand. In spite of this close resemblance, Judge
Posner relied in part on Nimmer's preconcerted intent for his
decision and was short of reaffirming Judge Hand's "but for" tests
65. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004).
66. Teresa Huang, Note, The Right Step in Determining Joint Authorshipfor
CopyrightedMaterial,20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 673 (2005) (arguing that Judge
Posner's decision accorded with Nimmer's view and would foster creativity).
67. Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659. His finding was not exact because the quote
indicated only a division of labor. Taking it carelessly, one may mistakenly

consider that an inker or a colorist can unconditionally become joint authors
without making intellectual contribution.
68. Nevertheless, there was neither written agreement on joint authorship nor
copyright assignment between Gaiman and McFarlane. Id. at 650.
69. Id. at 659-60 (emphasis added).
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in Edward B. Marks more than sixty years earlier. Additionally,
the independently copyrightable contribution standard purportedly
abandoned by Judge Posner was exactly what Judge Hand did not
support in Maurel more than ninety years ago. The much
acclaimed adoption of Nimmer's paradigm suggests that
opportunistic behaviors lurking in the standard of mutual intent for
joint authorship still remain insufficiently recognized.
C. OpportunisticBehaviors Defeated
Since Mergenthalerv. Scudder, patent courts were meticulous in
defeating opportunistic behaviors to misattribute other person's
The case of Applegate v. Scherer
intellectual contribution."
revealed how easily a client could cook up a patent application
based on a salesman's disclosure, through a letter, of his
company's new chemical compound.7' The court found the letter
to meet the test of conception and constitute a full disclosure of the
invention. Being fully aware of opportunism inherent with the
sequential nature of workflow steps, the court understood that once
instantiations of inventive ideas were completed and disclosed
they could be easily reduced to practice and misappropriated.
Considering disclosure and communications of patentable
invention to be beneficial, the court defeated the opportunistic
behavior in the race for the first filing of patent application.72
Morse v. Porter showed a more sophisticated opportunistic
behavior in patenting a very close business partner's intellectual
contribution.7 3 Morse contacted Winch to supply fabrics for his
tests of a new molded sanitary napkin. Different fabric materials
were requested when tests failed. Though Morse did not reveal his
purpose, Winch pretty much guessed what Morse was up to, and
when it was close to a breakthrough, they separately filed patent

70. Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1897).
71. Applegate v. Scherer, 332 F.2d 571 (C.C.P.A. 1964).

72. The court rejected that "one could never communicate an invention
thought up by him to another who is to try it out, for, when the tester succeeds,
the one who does no more than exercise ordinary skill would be rewarded and
the innovator would not be." See id. at 573-74.
73. Morse v. Porter,

155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 280 (Pat. Off. Board Pat.

Interferences 1965).
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applications. The court found that Morse claimed only the new
napkin, whereas the Winch application claimed both the fabrics
and its combination in the sanitary napkin. Morse won the case
when the court opined, "[t]his examination and testing Morse was
competent to do by experience and test facilities, and this he did."74
Winch was the defeated opportunist because in the consistent
project perspective the court was able to tell that he was only a
market supplier of the requested fabrics and did not make specific
intellectual contribution with respect to the new sanitary napkin.
During the litigation process of Kimberly-ClarkCorp. v. Proctor
& Gamble Distributing Co., the defendant requested the court to
order the naming of Buell and Blevins as joint inventors.75 Were
the allegedly unintentional error in naming joint inventors
corrected, the defendant's patent would have priority over the
plaintiffs. The district court found, instead, that the defendant
worked alone and knew nothing of the earlier work of Buell and
Blevins and that Buell and Blevins knew nothing of the
defendant's work. Consistent with the workflow model, the court
insisted on the examination of who did what in the claimed
collaborative efforts to defeat the opportunistic behavior. The
priority contest case also suggests competition in first-to-invent to
be a reason why mutual intent never reached the level of a joint
inventorship standard.76
The court in Mattor v. Coolegem similarly examined workflow
steps and associated intellectual contributions to defeat the
defendant's argument.77 Earlier, a lab assistant was incorrectly
listed as a joint inventor with his employer in a patent application
and the misjoinder was corrected during patent examination.
Surprisingly, the defendant of the case argued in court that the
issued patent was invalid because the true inventor should have
been the lab assistant. The lab assistant hired to follow the sole
inventor's instructions to conduct experiments, nevertheless, came
74. Id. at 283.
75. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
76. It also raises a doubt in requiring mutual intent for joint authorship
because, to some degree, copyright registration is similarly susceptible to
opportunistic first filing.
77. Mattor v. Coolegem, 530 F.2d 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
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forward to present her notebook in support of her former
employer. Consistent with economic logic, the court found the lab
assistant's attribution to have been correctly removed during
patent examination because her assistance was market
substitutable and any other lab assistant could have accomplished
the same for the employer.
The court of Yeda Research & Development Co. v. ImClone
Systems Inc. successfully defeated the worst kind of opportunistic
behaviors."8 Three scientists associated with the plaintiff published
their research results as a journal article in 1988 but did not pursue
a patent application. It was not until about ten years later that they
found that the text and figures of their draft paper had been
extensively copied to the specification of a granted patent.79 This
was only possible because the senior-named inventor was
previously a colleague of the three scientists. This senior-named
inventor was a member of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, and his publications were among the most cited papers in
the world. Being the dominant supervisor who had recruited other
named inventors, he was in a better position than that of Winch in
Morse to collude with the scientists he hired, and having
previously given his samples to a true inventor, he argued in the
court like the salesman in Applegate. Nevertheless, alert in
detecting opportunistic behaviors, the court insisted on the detailed
examination of all six workflow steps to conclude that none of the
named inventors acquired conception to the invention. The court
honored the subjects making the intellectual contributions by
ordering a correction for the true inventors. The true inventors
thus did not need to undertake actual prosecution of a patent
application because a hired patent specialist could have completed
related market substitutable endeavors. Most of all, like Judge
Hand in efficient joint authorship cases, the court did not

78. Yeda Research & Dev. Co. v. ImClone Sys. Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d
570 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

79. See id. at 613, 614 (describing circumstances surrounding defendants'
"unclean hands"). In a similarly appalling case showing the wholesale copyand-paste of a published paper to patent application, the plaintiff got back sole
inventorship and the defendant was found not qualified as a joint inventor. See
Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D.

Colo. 2000).
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invalidate the patent for lack of intention for a patent.
On the other hand, the infringement case of Kyjen Co. v. VoToys, Inc. confirms how surprising and absurd opportunistic
behaviors may be associated with a copyrighted work."
It is
interesting because the defendant counter-argued that the
plaintiff's Chinese translator and Chinese manufacturer
contributed significantly to the designs and should have instead
been the true authors. The defendant's opportunistic behavior
failed in part because the Chinese translator and the Chinese
manufacturer honestly disclaimed any intellectual contribution.'
Consistent with the workflow model, the court found that the
plaintiff reviewed her sketches, explained marks of the sketches,
and discussed how the product should look with her Chinese
translator. The plaintiff also reviewed the prototype and explained
necessary changes with her Chinese manufacturer. The court
reached an efficient decision that the plaintiff was the sole author
because she had confirmed and instantiated the consistent project,
while international division of labor was utilized to manufacture
the products.
Work-for-hire was opportunistically used as the final defense
but was ultimately defeated in the frivolous case of Schmid Bros.
Inc. v. W. Goebel PorzellanfabrikKG., where the joint authorship
of a deceased nun was involved. 2 It was frivolous because the
defendant already had an uncontested joint interest of copyrighted
works and had no proof whatsoever to disclaim the deceased nun's
joint interest. Like Shapiro Bernstein, the case confirms that
opportunistic behavior is more problematic in copyright than
patent cases simply because the duration of protection is much
longer. Indeed, betting that heirs of the nun might not have
properly maintained the records, the assignee in the instant case
stopped paying royalties after the nun died.

80. Kyjen Co. v. Vo-Toys, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

81. Conversely, when a Taiwanese artist completed all workflow steps of a
consistent project, the importing company that merely suggested the type of
animal to be designed by the artist could not retain authorship. See Nadel &
Sons Toy Corp. v. William Shaland Corp., No. 85 Civ. 5108, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13305 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1989).
82. Schmid Bros., Inc. v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik KG., 589 F. Supp.
497 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Without going to the detail, a professor's opportunistic behavior
against his doctoral student was spotted and checked in the
8 3 As the opportunistic
unfortunate case of Seshadri v. Kasraian.
behavior was associated with the professor's unilateral withdrawal
of a submitted draft paper listing the student as the first author, the
case confirms that the long journal review process, like that of
patent examination, helps early detection of opportunistic
misattribution.
Similar to the two earlier cases involving
professors, the case further confirms that opportunistic behavior
indeed occurred when a dominant supervisor was involved.
V. INEFFICIENT JOINT AUTHORSHIP STANDARDS
Opportunistic behaviors, of which the above cases were
intended to remind, unfortunately went undetected in recent cases
adopting inefficient joint authorship standards.
This Section
shows how a failure to notice opportunistic behaviors lurking in
the step of fixing intellectual fruits in a tangible medium, and the
control of decision making authority, has led to the copyright
courts' predicament.
Subsection A reveals how judges have
utilized confusing standards of superintendence and control rather
than take advantage of available tools in their decision-making
arsenal. In a comparative review of Childress v. Taylor and
Thomson v. Larson, Subsection B further clarifies how an
opportunist would always prevail under the standard of mutual
intent, which is also shown to be the standard of superintendence
and control in disguise.84 Finally, the root cause of inefficient joint
authorship standards is traced in Subsection C to copyright law's
failure to insist on the truthful identities of subjects making an
intellectual contribution.
A.

Drifting into the Confusing Standardof Superintendence and
Control

Copyright infringement of a film was at issue in the case of
83. Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 1997). The case was more

about the plaintiff s right of integrity not promulgated in the copyright law. Id.
84. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998); Childress v. Taylor,
945 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1991).
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Lindsay v. R.MS. Titanic, where the defendants argued that the
plaintiff was not the author because he neither dove underwater
nor photographed the wreckage. 5 After examining the plaintiffs
endeavors in the workflow steps, the court opined, "[a]ll else being
equal, where a plaintiff alleges that he exercised such a high
degree of control over a film operation . . . such that the final
product duplicates his conceptions and visions of what the film
should look like, the plaintiff may be said to be an 'author."' 86 As
the plaintiff clearly made intellectual contributions, the court's
decision was certainly correct.
The same decision could,
nevertheless, have been reached through Justice O'Connor's
finding in Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
a case decided less than ten years before Lindsay, because diving
and photographing underwater were nothing but "sweat of the
brow".87 The court's creation of the new term "high degree of
control" was unnecessary and confusing because it may be
expanded to mean something other than an intellectual
contribution.88
Such unnecessary confusion indeed occurred, and was further
exacerbated, in the case of Aalmuhammed v. Lee, where the
plaintiff alleged to be a joint author of the movie Malcolm X. 9 As
to the plaintiff's claim, the court opined that "Aalmuhammed did
not at any time have superintendence of the work
Aalmuhammed lacked control over the work, and absence of
control is strong evidence of the absence of co-authorship. 9 °
There were two related impetuses behind the court's preference for
"superintendence" and "control". First, the court was confronted
with too many possible authors for a movie and considered the
85. Lindsay v. R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15837 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1999).
86. Id. at *15-16 (emphasis added). The defendants' argument that the
photographer should be a joint author was rejected as well. Id. at *20-21.
87. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
88. Cf Thomson, 147 F.3d at 202 (emphasizing "decision-making authority
over what changes are made and what is included in a work"); Erickson v.
Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1072 (7th Cir. 1994) (where it was conceded
that Erickson had complete discretion over what was included in the play, there
could be no joint authorship).
89. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
90. Id. at 1235.
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standard of copyrightable work set forth in Feist too broad.9
Second, independently copyrightable contribution was present in
the case because some of Aalmuhammed's script revisions were
included in the released version of the film. The court thus
resorted to Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony in
emphasizing "the person who has superintended the
arrangement.

'92

Isolating

the

superintendence

aspect,

and

connecting it with Thomson's emphasis of decision making
authority, the court concurred with Lindsay that "an author
'superintends' the work by exercising control."93 Nevertheless, in
the consistent project perspective, the plaintiff did not make an
intellectual contribution in confirming the drama of Malcolm X 94
It could have also been found that his claimed contributions, both
as an Arabic translator and in making script changes, were all
market substitutable endeavors but not intellectual contributions.95
Thus, different versions of mere suggestion for an efficient
determination of intellectual contribution and authorship were in
the court's tool bag but were not employed.
Superintendence and control connote the powers associated with
administration and resource allocation, which are apparently not
intellectual contributions to a work of authorship. Indeed, more
recently, the court in Caffey v. Cook strayed into opining that
"whether Caffey always exercised the right to absolute creative
control is irrelevant to whether, in the first instance, he had the
authority to do so."96 In another case, Brown v. Flowers, a sound

91. Id. at 1232 (candidates for authorship considered by the court include the
stars, the chief cinematographer, screenwriters, animators, composers, the
director imposing artistic judgments, and the producer raising the money).
92. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884).
93. SeeAalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234.
94. Id. at 1229 (Aalmuhammed was hired because he had previously written,
directed, and produced a documentary about Malcolm X). The movie Malcolm
X, however, was an original work with dramatic imagination; nevertheless, the
court failed to distinguish the two projects.
95. Id. at 1230 (noting that the script changes were a result of
Aalmuhammed's role as an editor of a literary work). This market substitutable
endeavor was already compensated by Spike Lee for $ 25,000. Id.
96. Caffey v. Cook, 409 F. Supp. 2d 484, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphases
added).
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engineer claimed joint authorship with a musician.97 The court
held that, by only adding riffs and beats, the sound engineer did
not make independently copyrightable contributions, and rejected
the claim. Referring to the control standard set forth in Childress
and Aalmuhammed, a judge nevertheless dissented in arguing that
"[the sound engineer] had significant decision making authority
over the substance and form of the master recordings."98 The
dissenting judge further consulted complementary intellectual
contributions, as argued in Nimmer's paradigm and Judge Posner's
Gaiman decision, and opined that Brown should be a joint
author.99 However, if his attention was not distracted by the
confusing requirement of superintendence and control, he could
have simply pulled out from his tool bag Judge Hand's "but for"
test to argue for Brown's joint authorship in contributing
interpenetrating riffs and beats on top of Flowers' music and
lyrics.
The adoption of the superintendence and control standard was
also arbitrary. On the one hand, its adoption may falsely protect
an opportunist in control of decision- making authority from being
effectively challenged by a true author. On the other hand, judges
in Aalmuhammed adopted it simply to deny joint authorship to the
plaintiff, whom the court even considered to have indeed made
some independently copyrightable intellectual contribution. In
sum, despite the fact that some courts have correctly limited it to
mean artistic control, the confusing standard of superintendence
and control demonstrates why there is growing concern with joint
attribution. "0

97. Brown v. Flowers, 196 F. App'x 178 (4th Cir. 2006).

98. Id. at 191 (Gregory, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
99. See id. at 189 (Gregory, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)
(citing JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1028 (N.D. Ill.

2003) (holding a record producer a joint author for "capturing and electronically
processing the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make a final sound
recording") and Morrill v. Smashing Pumpkins, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1122
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that the music video was a joint work and the

performer and the producer were joint authors)).
100. See, e.g., Brod v. Gen. Publ'g Group, Inc., 32 F. App'x 231 (9th Cir.

2002) (clarifying artistic control for joint authorship and rejecting necessary
superintendence beyond artistic control); Tang v. Putruss, 521 F. Supp. 2d 600
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/4
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The Mutual Intent Standardin Reality

My case review ends with Childress and Thomson for two
reasons. First, they influenced courts to venture into the confusing
standard of superintendence and control. Second, they offered the
best arguments for adopting the standard of mutual intent for joint
authorship." 1 Since my ultimate purpose is to identify the root
cause of the disparity between efficient and inefficient standards, a
comparative review in this Subsection is presented to show more
clearly how the courts have missed complementary intellectual
contributions and opportunistic behaviors, arbitrarily interpreted
the pieces of evidence to find a lack of mutual intent, and
eventually ushered in the standard of superintendence and control.
A very brief summary of the two cases is in order." 2 Both cases
involved joint authorship disputes in a play. In the case of
Childress, the plaintiff obtained copyright registration in her own
name for the play Moms: A Praise Play for a Black Comedienne
("Moms") and the defendant argued that she was a joint author.
The heirs of a deceased copyright holder were the defendants in
Thomson, where the plaintiff sought her joint authorship for the
play Rent. The parties were similarly involved with each other:
whereas the plaintiff Taylor invited the defendant Childress to
rescue her scripts of the play Moms, the defendant Larson invited
the plaintiff Thomson to rescue his still-promising scripts of the
play Rent."°3 There was no written agreement showing mutual
(E.D. Mich. 2007) (denying opportunistic joint authorship claim for lack of

artistic control).
101. The lower court in each case required mutual intent for joint authorship.
See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 205 (2d Cir. 1998); Childress v. Taylor,
No. 87 Civ. 6924, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15969, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27,
1990). Upon appeal Judge Jon Newman and Judge Guido Calabresi upheld the
lower court decisions and wrote the case opinions supporting the standard of

mutual intent.
102. The two cases have been critically reviewed in literature; therefore, I

focus only on shedding new light pertaining to the unique points offered in this
Note. See generally, e.g., Faye Buckalew, A Critique of the Law in the Second
Circuit Following Childress v. Taylor and as Exemplified in Thomson v.
Larson, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 545 (1998); Fox, supra note 25; Jane C. Lee,
Comment, Upstaging the Playwright: The Joint Authorship Entanglement
between Dramaturgsand Playwrights, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 75 (1998).
103. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200 ("Taylor convinced playwright Alice
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intent for a joint work or joint authorship in either case. The
nonjoinders, Taylor and Thomson, lost their suits against the
copyright holders, Childress and Larson. Both courts purportedly
adopted Goldstein's paradigm of joint authorship; nevertheless, the
court in Childress did not determine whether Taylor made an
independently copyrightable contribution, whereas the Thomson
court noted that Thomson indeed made some independently
copyrightable contribution to the Rent scripts." ° Both nonjoinder
claims, however, were ultimately rejected because there was no
evidence supporting an intention to include the nonjoinder as a
joint author."°5
1.

Joint Works Unidentified

Contrary to what was suggested by the rejection of the
nonjoinder claims, both plays should have been legally defined
joint works. The reasons were clearer in Thomson, where the
musical Rent was originally a collaborative project between
Aronson and Larson. Larson's later development of scripts over
the next three years garnered some favorable reception and the
work was considered promising; however, the professional
consensus was that "it needed a great deal of work."1"6 Through
Thomson's rescue, the resulting "October version" of the play
Rent was characterized by experts as "a radical transformation of
the show," and since its opening on Broadway the show "has been
an astounding critical, artistic, and commercial success."10 7 In the
consistent project perspective, there were complementary
intellectual endeavors, though not of the pure form. With Larson
confirming the project idea as well as instantiating promising
Childress to rescue the project by writing a new script." (emphasis added));
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1991).
104. See Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200-01 ("Thomson made at least some nonde minimis copyrightable contribution." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
105. See id. at 206-07 (opining that "Jonathan Larson lacked the requisite
intent to accept Lynn Thomson as a co-author of Rent"); Childress, 945 F.2d at
509 (concluding that there was no evidence present supporting "that Childress
shared Taylor's notion that they were co-authors" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
106. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 207.
107. Id. at 198.
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lyrics and Thomson instantiating the superbly artistic scripts, their
complementary intellectual contributions were inseparable or
interdependent parts merged to the unitary whole that has since
won the Pulitzer Prize and Tony Award.
Since contribution, as Nimmer's plot idea, was heretical for joint
authorship at the time, it was more difficult for the Childress court
to find complementary intellectual contributions. Four major
facts, however, support that Taylor confirmed the plot idea of the
play Moms, while Childress instantiated the confirmed project
idea." 8 First, before she sought Childress' help, Taylor had a
script for a play about the black comedienne. 9 Second, before she
recruited Childress, Taylor obtained a conditional promise from
Green Plays Theatre to stage her play."0 The conditional promise
was that improvements should be completed in six weeks, which
suggests that, however unsatisfactory Taylor's script and primitive
her plot idea were, Green Plays Theatre was persuaded into giving
Taylor a chance for their successful improvement within the
required time. Third, Childress was initially not interested in
writing the scripts, and she was reluctant in accepting Taylor's
invitation because she would only have six weeks to modify the
scripts. In comparison, it took Thomson seven months to complete
artistic instantiations of the Rent scripts with Larson, who had
already confirmed the project idea and received some promising
lyrics. This therefore suggests that Taylor's scripts and plot ideas
were sufficiently ripe to persuade Childress into accepting the
rescuing role. Fourth, additional facts indicate that not only had
Taylor worked with Childress in confirming improved plot ideas
and instilling consistent instantiations, but also that Childress
would have otherwise torn apart the script in the six weeks.
The above summaries show that, but for Taylor's intellectual
contribution, Childress could not have finished her instantiation to
obtain satisfactory scripts in six weeks, and but for Thomson's
intellectual contribution Larson's Rent scripts would have
remained only promising. Not being able to examine the cases in
108. Taylor was a veteran actress and Childress was a playwright who had
been an "Obie" award winner. Childress, 945 F.2d at 502.
109. See Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200 ("Taylor wrote a script ... but Taylor
was unable to get it produced as a play.").
110. See Childress, 945 F.2d at 502.
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the consistent project perspective, the courts failed to find that both
plays met the joint work definition. Instead, the courts mistakenly
took Taylor for an ordinary research assistant responsible for the
step of gathering data and Thomson for a market substitutable
dramaturg. As a result, there is a tension between the two case
outcomes. While Thomson contributed award-winning artistic
scripts but was denied joint authorship, Childress was awarded
with sole authorship for scripts that were already next to excellent.
Since Larson and Taylor both confirmed plot ideas and contributed
some scripts, the tension can also be seen in a different way. That
is, while Larson received sole authorship of the play Rent, Taylor
was rejected as a joint author of the play Moms. The outcomes
were embarrassing because the true plot maker of the Moms scripts
and the true playwright of the artistic and award-winning Rent
scripts were missing.
Judge Hand did not allow such
embarrassment to happen in joint works more than ninety years
11
ago. '
2.

Unheeded Control of the Fixing Step

The courts got into such an embarrassing situation also by
failing to identify opportunistic behaviors lurking in
complementary intellectual collaboration. As analyzed earlier, the
sequential nature of workflow steps admonishes that opportunists
would usually exploit their control of the fixing step. Also,
copyright registration of artistic works is more susceptible to
opportunism because prior examination, such as that utilized in
patent applications or academic paper submissions, does not exist.
These opportunistic behaviors were clear in Childress. Taylor
did not write well and her confirmed plot ideas could only be
instantiated by Childress. Since both the instantiating and the
fixing steps coincided with writing play scripts, Childress was in
control of the strategic high ground because she knew when the
scripts would be completed and could file immediate copyright
111. Taylor's plot ideas and Childress's script were as complementary as
Loraine's music and Marks' lyrics. See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). Similarly, Larson's scripts
and Thomson's scripts were more or less like Maurel's scenario and Smith's
libretto. See Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
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registration on her own. The facts of the case provide clues to
Childress' opportunistic behaviors. ' 1 First, as a veteran script
writer, Childress knew the legal consequences of obtaining a
copyright registration. Second, despite the letter sent by Taylor to
Childress for a joint authorship agreement at an early stage of
Childress' writing, Childress did not reply until five weeks later to
indicate "originality for her words".
Third, Childress thus
hurriedly filed copyright registration under her name only as soon
as she finished the scripts. Fourth, Childress again hurriedly filed
another copyright registration for new materials added to the
second production of Moms at another theater. Fifth, soon
afterwards, Childress rejected another draft agreement proposed by
Taylor. Childress had to hurry for the first copyright registration
because it contained not only her expressions but also Taylor's
intellectual contribution.
With learning-by-doing, additional
materials instantiated in the revised scripts for the second
production would contain relatively more of Childress' intellectual
contribution.
Thus, by consistently taking two copyright
registrations with her name only and showing no intent to have
Taylor as a joint author, Childress should at least have been able to
secure joint authorship even if the suit were instead brought by
Taylor.
The opportunistic behaviors were equally clear in Thomson; the
only difference was that Larson unexpectedly died just hours after
the final dress rehearsal for the play's off-Broadway opening.
First, Larson broke his promise to Aronson.
When their
collaboration ended, Larson promised Aronson that the play's title
would always be "RENT a rock opera by Jonathan Larson.
'' 13
Original concept and additional lyrics by Billy Aronson."
However, every script brought to the court showed only "Rent, by
Jonathan Larson." In addition, just nine days before his death,
Larson authorized the playbill for the off-Broadway opening to list
himself as "author/composer" and Thomson as dramaturg."'
Apparently, neither gave any indication of Aronson's intellectual
contribution. Were the promise kept, the audience would have
understood that Larson was more of a composer of the rock music
112. Childress,945 F.2d at 502-03.
113. Thomson, 147 F.3dat 197.
114. Id. at 203.
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part, but did not contribute as much to plot ideas or lyrics. Second,
Larson also broke his promise to Thomson. In her written
testimony containing a conversation with Larson, Thomson made
it clear that she initially considered herself only as a usual
dramaturg and was flattered when Larson unexpectedly asked her
to contribute actual language to the script. Her unexpected role
was not fanciful but confirmed by a promise she claimed Larson
made: "I'll always acknowledge your contribution . . .I would
'
never say that I wrote what you did."115
The quote might have
reflected Larson's true passion, or it might have been meant only
to draw out more of Thomson's unique talents. Regardless, the
inclusion of Thomson as dramaturg in the playbill did not inform
the audience that Thomson made intellectual contributions through
superbly artistic instantiations.
With Larson listed as
author/composer in the playbill, audiences and professionals
would instead consider Larson to have contributed all plot ideas,
scripts, and music. Larson was able to break his promise because
he was in the strategic high ground of both controlling the word
processing and storage of Rent scripts on his own computer as well
as wielding the decision making authority over who would be

credited with what."16

3.

Good Samaritan v. Opportunist

Taylor and Thomson were Good Samaritans when compared to
Childress' and Larson's opportunistic behaviors. Despite the fact
that Childress did not respond to her joint authorship proposal,
Taylor continued to "help" Childress. Taylor's help included
conducting more research at Childress's request, taking her to
interviews, and discussing characters and scenes." 7 Similarly,
Thomson continued contributing to the Rent scripts even after

115. Id. at 205.

116. Id. at 197 ("Larson himself entered all changes directly onto his
computer.").
117. Childress, 945 F.2d at 502.

Note that Judge Newman did not

characterize Childress's contributions as a "rescue" as Judge Calabresi later did
in Thomson. Childress, 945 F.2d. at 509 ("Childress was asked to write a play
about 'Moms' Mabley and did so. To facilitate her writing task, she accepted

the assistance that Taylor provided." (emphases added)).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/4
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Larson's untimely death.
For the sake of argument, since Taylor supervised the progress
of Childress' script writing, she could have seized the opportunity
to make a copy of the first draft and file a copyright registration
under her name only." 8 Thomson could have also keyed in all her
intellectual contributions over Larson's original scripts to obtain a
beta version and file for her own copyright registration, while
holding back some of her instantiations from Larson. These kinds
of preemptive acts could have provided very powerful bargaining
chips for a settlement, should Childress and Larson respectively
have made a nonjoinder claim. Nevertheless, as Good Samaritans,
Taylor and Thomson could never think of such opportunistic acts
and would only continue to contribute while waiting trustfully for
their joint authorship.
The two cases may, thus, be represented as Good Samaritan v.
Opportunist.
Failing to find complementary intellectual
contributions and associated opportunistic behaviors lurking in
complementary intellectual endeavors, the courts held the
Opportunist to be the sole author on the ground that there was no
evidence showing a mutual intent for joint authorship. The fate of
Thomson or Taylor was not determined by intellectual
contributions but dependent on whether Larson or Childress were
Good Samaritans. Consistent with the second result of my
economic analysis, the comparative review shows that the
defendant in Good Samaritan v. Opportunistwould always prevail
under the adopted mutual intent standard because it is biased in
favor of the dominant decision maker and against the true joint
author.
4.

Three InterrelatedMisgivings

The adopted mutual intent standard further shows three
interrelated misgivings. First, the outcomes of the two cases were
sensitive to the courts' choice of manifested time of intent. The
pieces of evidence examined by the courts spanned a period of
time; however, the specific time of required intent manifestation
118. There was an agreement of "$2,500 to be paid upon submission of the
First Draft." Id. at 503 (emphasis added). Additionally, Taylor regularly
supervised the progress of the play. Id. at 502.
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was never made explicit. Whereas under Nimmer's preconcerted
intent Taylor's letter to Childress and Larson's promise to Aronson
and Thomson could not be easily dismissed, they would be of no
force under Goldstein's time when the writing was done." 9 Yet,
the courts neither explained why Nimmer's time was not adopted
nor indicated whether intent manifested at a later date would carry
more weight than that at an earlier date.
Second, there could be no fact-finding result other than
insufficient evidence showing the Opportunist's intention to have
the Good Samaritan as a joint author. 2 ' Apparently, if later
evidence showing Thomson's outstanding contribution carried
more weight, then the court would easily find the true outstanding
artistic author embarrassingly missing. Nevertheless, as Larson's
earlier refusal to accept assistance could hardly improve the Rent
script, the court's insistence in awarding him sole authorship could
neither enhance his artistic skill in writing. For another example,
finding that Larson used the term "co-author" in two separate
previous copyright registrations, the court concurred with the
lower court that Larson understood the legal significance of the
term and conceived "dramaturg" to be a different role. The
playbill's "author/composer" was similarly interpreted to affirm
Larson's insistence of sole authorship. However, the problematic
contradiction would not easily go away, because the slash in
"author/composer" and the term "composer" simply did not have
any legal meaning. 2 '
Third, the standard of mutual intent for joint authorship became
indistinguishable from the standard of superintendence and
control. As analyzed earlier, an opportunist would act consistently
such that objective indicia showing intention to have a joint author
could not be found. That the district court found, and the Second
Circuit affirmed, that "Mr. Larson never regarded himself as a

119. If the courts adopted Goldstein's transplanted intent, then none of the
courts' objective indicia prior to the completion of the "October version" should

be relevant.
120. Because of space limitation, similar criticism against the court's
interpretation of Childress is omitted.

121. Other inconsistent interpretations appeared as a result of the court's
unspecified standard; however, it is not the purpose here to enumerate each and

every one of them.
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joint author with Ms. Thomson" was thus not a surprise. 1 2 Since

fact-finding through billing, credit, and third-party contracts were
circumstantial, a search to ascertain the decision-making authority
should be at the center of the adopted mutual intent standard.
Indeed, the previously referenced conversation between Thomson
and Larson was interpreted not as a broken promise but to show
that "the script was within Mr. Larson's sole and complete
discretion.'1 23

The Second Circuit similarly agreed with the

district court's interpretation of the agreement between Larson and
the production theater after the "October version" as showing that
"Larson had final approval over all changes to Rent and that all
such changes would become Larson's property."' 24 Mutual intent
was thus only a disguise, and the two cases ushered in the standard
of superintendence and control.'25
The review also reveals an ironic fate of Goldstein's and
Nimmer's paradigms in reality. The courts, concerned with
spurious claims of co-ownership, found independently
copyrightable contributions insufficient to narrow down coownership interests.'26 Nimmer's and Goldstein's mutual intent
were similarly deemed unsatisfactory. As a result, the adopted
mutual intent standard was rather a mixture that required, without
specific reference to Nimmer's or Goldstein's time of intent
manifestation, some objective indicia to show Nimmer's intention
for joint authorship. This puzzling turn into a relationship-based
standard would be fine if opportunism were not a problem.'27
Opportunistic behaviors lurking in the step of fixing intellectual
contribution into a tangible medium and the control of decisionmaking authority, however, were insufficiently recognized to
result in a bias favoring the Opportunist and working against the
122. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 205 (2d Cir. 1998).
123. See id. at 203 (emphasis added).
124. See id. (emphasis added).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 200-01; Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508-09 (explaining
the courts' explicit concerns with "no discernable limit" of co-ownership
interest).
127. See Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive
Collaborator:Preserving the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 255
(2001) (criticizing courts' deviation from the creative process view in legislative
history to the implied "relationship test" of mutual intent).
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Good Samaritan. Emphatically, it is biased because an opportunist
would act consistently so that no evidence other than his own
superintendence and control could be found.
C. The Missing Grand View of Truthful Identity
The embarrassing predicament of recent joint authorship
standards were indeed results of the courts' failure to notice the
emphasized technical considerations. Nevertheless, the old joint
authorship cases of Maurel, Edward B. Marks, and Shapiro
Bernstein show that, like patent courts, copyright courts were able
to appreciate these technical considerations and check
opportunistic exclusion of a joint author in copyright registration.
The disparity between efficient and inefficient court standards of
joint authorship thus hints at a failure beyond technicalities.
The inclusion of both inventors and authors in the same
framework of attribution determination is not ambitiously
overarching, but rather is advantageous in finding the root cause of
the efficiency disparity. As the emphasized technicalities form the
common basis of my theoretical analyses, the efficiency disparity
from case reviews must come from additional institutional factors
asymmetrically influencing the courts. 28 The concern of judges
with spurious claims of equal and undivided copyright ownership,
however, is not valid because courts in joint inventorship cases
shared the same co-ownership concern but did not overlook the
opportunistic behaviors involved. The aversion to censorship or
prior examination of copyrightable works certainly had a role in
Childress. Though heirs of Larson were involved in Thomson, it
was not a case arising from the long duration of copyright
protection. Neither institutional factor can be a scapegoat because
the courts in Seshadri and Schmid Bros were also able to defeat the
opportunistic claims. Since these surprising turns to inefficient
joint authorship standards all occurred after the Copyright Act of
1976, the ambiguous meaning of intention in its joint work
definition seems to be a good source of the inefficiency.
Nevertheless, the idea of intention was just as ambiguous when
128. Case reviews are preferred in my research because an econometric study
offers little insight beyond the variables selected.

Additionally, institutional

factors considered here are not variables.
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efficient, older cases were decided.
The last institutional source lies with asymmetry in the
copyright law patent law's treatments of misattribution. As
introduced earlier, whereas the patent law mandates a correction of
misjoinder or nojoinder, the copyright law is entirely silent on both
types of error in authorial attribution and its correction. Thus, for
a copyrighted work, the copyright law misses the grand view of
the Constitutional Clause in protecting inventors and authors, and
fails to insist on the truthful identity of the subject making
intellectual contribution. 129 With truthful identity of an inventor in
sight, judges of patent courts have been consistently developing
efficient standards of invention conception as well as sole and joint
inventorship. Most plausibly, missing the grand view of the
truthful identity of an author, courts hearing authorship disputes
gradually lost track of the guiding star and were distracted to the
concern with spurious claims of co-ownership. As an unintended
consequence, inefficient joint authorship standards became recent
courts' quid pro quos in limiting the number of equal, undivided
co-ownership interests.
For the asymmetry in institutional
arrangement and the asymmetrical development of court standards,
the root cause of the disparity between efficient joint inventorship
standards as well as old joint authorship standards and inefficient
recent joint authorship standards is ultimately traced to the
copyright law's failure to insist on the truthful identity of the
subject making intellectual contribution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judge Guido Calabresi, with Douglas Melamed as his joint
author, long ago recognized that model-building has its
shortcomings and compensating advantages. 3 ° Nobel Laureate
George Stigler also once commented that "a . . . more
controversial role for economics is in the study of legal institutions
129. U.S. CONST., art. I, §8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
130. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rule, Liability Rule,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1128
(1972).
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This Note thus does not pretend to have

obtained the definition for statutory inventor or author, sole or
joint. On the contrary, the emphasized technicalities of structural
changes in technology and organization lend support to some
statutory ambiguity in their definitions. Because of additional
technicalities associated with sequential workflow steps and
complementary intellectual endeavors, neither does this Note
support obscure statutory definitions susceptible to opportunistic
manipulation. What cannot be denied is that tradeoffs inevitably
exist in their interpretations, especially because they are not
defined. It is also undeniable that judges are charged with the duty
to strike a balance as structural changes continue to develop.
Stripping off its technical aspects, this Note considers that
judges, like anyone else, need a Pole Star to guide their
professional adventures. The truthful identity of the subject
making intellectual contributions has been the Pole Star leading
patent court judges in developing efficient court standards of sole
and joint inventorship. However, in its absence, judges of recent
joint authorship disputes could only find independently
copyrightable contribution, mutual intent, and superintendence and
control as their anchors in the darkness of their joint authorship
adventure. The cost is not only that opportunists have recently
prevailed in courts, but also that a wasteful race has been
unintentionally generated. In contrast to the familiar necessary
evil of first-to-invent, the wasteful race is in the control of
decision-making authority, especially over the step of fixing
intellectual fruits into a tangible medium. Whereas opportunists
race to misattribute and misappropriate, Good Samaritans cannot
help but join the race for fear of being misattributed and
misappropriated.
In conclusion, this Note informs that inefficiency of joint
authorship standards can be rectified and the wasteful race can be
stopped.
First, as my case reviews have shown, finding
intellectual contribution and detecting opportunistic behaviors in
real cases are operational with the emphasized technical
considerations in the tool bag. Second, as patent judges have
shown, an amendment of the copyright law to insist on the truthful

131. George Stigler, Law or Economics?, 35 J.L. & EcON. 455, 467 (1992).
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identity of the subject making intellectual contribution will provide
the necessary guiding light for copyright judges to develop
efficient joint authorship standards.
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